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EXTENT OF THE STATES' JURISDICTION TO TAX
Perhaps the most difficult and perplexing problems in this entire field
arise in the application of the tax to residents and non-residents, to
income from sources within the state and from sources without the
state. In the leading case of the State Tar on Foreign-Held Bonds3'
the United States Supreme Court laid down the rule that "The power
of taxation is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of
the State. Those subjects are persons, property and business. What-
ever form taxation may assume it must relate to one of these subjects."
Mr. Justice Brown, in a later case, explained this rule :32 "The power
of taxation, 'indispensable to the existence of every civilized govern-
ment, is exercised upon the assumption of an equivalent rendered to the
taxpayer in the protection of his person and property, in adding to the
value of such property, or in the creation and maintenance of public
conveniences in which he shares. If the taxing power be in no position
to render these services or otherwise to benefit the person or property
taxed, and such property be wholly within the taxing power of another
state, the taxation of such property within the domicil of the owner par-
takes rather of the nature of an extortion than of a tax." Obviously a
state may tax the income of a resident earned within the state, for,
whether an income-tax is to be regarded as a tax on the person, on the
property, or on the business of the taxpayer, in this case all three ele-
ments are subject to the jurisdiction of the state. It is quite as obvious
that income earned without the state by a non-resident cannot be taxed;
income, as such, is not taxable by a state which has no other relation
towards it than that of covetousness. It remains to consider the taxa-
bility of income earned within the state by non-residents and without
the state by residents.
In Shaffer v. Carter"3 the Supreme Court assumed that a tax on the
total net income of a resident, though derived in whole or in part from
sources without the state, would not violate any constitutional provision
* Continued from the May issue, 34 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 759-764.
(1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 3oo; Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank (1893, U. S.)
i9 Wall. 490.





and held that a state might tax income earned within its boundaries
though the recipient of the income was a non-resident." The argu-
ment that the former proposition involved the recognition of the tax
as personal in its nature and precluded the Court from sustaining the
tax on the income of non-residents was brushed aside.' 5 The Court
was confronted with a real dilemma and, since theory and philosophic
principles could not help, wisely determined to disregard them. Shaffer
v. Carter6 itself gives us a new principle: "That the State, from whose
laws property and business and industry derive the protection and
security without which production and gainful occupation would be
impossible, is debarred from exacting a share of those gains in the form
of income-taxes for the support of the Government, is a proposition so
wholly inconsistent with fundamental principles as to be refuted by its
mere statement. That it may tax the land but not the crop, the tree
but not the fruit, the mine or well but not the product, the business but
not the profit derived from it, is wholly inadmissible."
But non-residents, taxed on their income earned within the State,
may not be discriminated against as non-residents. 7  In Shaffer v.
Carter3s the fact that residents were permitted to deduct from their
gross income all losses sustained anywhere while non-residents were
authorized to deduct only those incurred within the State, was held not
to be a denial of equal protction of the laws. The court said :9 "The
difference is only such as arises naturally from the extent of the juris-
diction of the state in the two classes of cases, and cannot be regarded
as an unfriendly or unreasonable discrimination. As to residents it may
and does exert its taxing power over their income from all sources,
whether within or without the state, and it accords to them a cor-
responding privilege of deducting their losses wherever these accrue.
As to non-residnts the jurisdiction extends only to their property
owned within the state and their business, trade or profession carried
on therein, and the tax is only on such income as is derived from those
sources." But if the losses of a resident outside the state are sufficient
to offset all his gains within the state he has no tax to pay; in Shaffer
v. Carter plaintiff did not show such losses but different treatment of a
"In view of the well-settled rule that a state may not tax tangible property
permanently situated in another state, this is a further argument that a tax on
income is not to be regarded simply as a tax on the source thereof.
' "Any Government which should attempt to impose a personal tax upon the
citizens of other states would justly incur the enlightened resentment of the
civilized world." State v. Ross (1852) 23 N. J. L. 5,7; Herrinan v. Stowers
(857) 43 Me. 497; Pendleton v. Commonwealth (19o9) nio Va. 229, 65 S. E. 536.
3'Supra note 30.
' Ward v. Maryland (i87o, U. S.) 12 Wall. 418; State v. Lancaster (884)
63 N. H. 267.
"Supra note 30.
"252 U. S. at p. 57, 40 Sup. Ct. at p. 227; (i92o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 799.
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non-resident in such a case would seem to be an unreasonable
discrimination.
The allowance of personal exemptions to residents under the New
York law, without equivalent exemptions for non-residents, was held
unconstitutional4 0 The law was then amended to give to non-residents
the same exemptions that residents enjoyed4 but it would probably have
been sufficient if non-residents were given merely such fraction of the
exemptions given to residents as represented the ratio between their
income from sources within the state and their total income.
A state may not tax income accruing to a non-resident from a source
without the state but it does not necessarily follow that a state may never
look beyond its own boundaries in assessing a tax on the income of a
non-resident from sources within the state.
The value of property results from the 'use to which it is put and
varies with the profitableness of that use, present and prospective.
Recognition of this elementary principle led to the sustaining of a state
general ad valorem tax on property'used in interstate commerce though
the value of that property was determined by considering the receipts
from such commerce.42  It was later the basis of a decision upholding
a tax law which determined the value of property in the state, owned
by express companies engaged in business within and without the state,
by taking that fraction of the value of the whole capital stock of such
companies which represented the ratio between the gross receipts and
mileage within the state and the total receipts and mileage.4 In
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,44 the Supreme Court sanc-
tioned the application of the "unit rule," as it is called, for the alloca-
tion of the income of non-residents where it appeared to have been
earned from property and activity partly within and partly without the
taxing state. Of course any unit rule is bound to be more or less arbi-
trary and unequal in its application, but it is a generally satisfactory
method of assessment or allocation, and any unit rule which is not obvi-
"Travis v. Yale & Toune Mfg. Co. (1920) 252 U. S. 6o, 40 Sup. Ct. 228.
N. Y. Laws, 1g2o, ch. 191.
Cleveland etc. Ry. v. Backus (1894) 154 U. S. 439, 14 Sup. Ct. 1122.
'St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas (1914) 235 U. S. 350, 35 Sup. Ct. 99; State
v. Railroads (I9o8) 215 Mo. 47Q, 495, 114 S. W. 956.
Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor (1897) 166 U. S. 185, 225, 17 Sup. Ct. 604,
6o8: "In conclusion let us say that this is an eminently practical age and that no
fine-spun theories about situs should interfere to enable these large corporations
whose business is carried on through many states to escape from bearing in each
state such burden of taxation as a fair distribution of the actual value of their
property among those states requires."
"* (192o) 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. 45. The Connecticut tax involved here
provided that the ratio between the value of all real and tangible, personal property
owned in the state and the value of all its real and tangible personalty, wherever
situated, should determine what fraction of the total net income of a foreign
corporation should be allocated to Connecticut.
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ously unreasonable or calculated to tax income from outside the state45
will be upheld.4 6
But may a state imposing a progressive income-tax look beyond the
state boundaries to find what the total income of the non-resident is
and then' apply the rate applicable to residents who receive income of
an equal amount to his income from sources within the jurisdiction?
In Maxwell v. Bugbe 7 the Supreme Court sustained a New Jersey
inheritance tax, levied on property in the state owned by a non-resident
decedent, though the tax was progressive and the rate was determined
by the total value of the estate regardless of where the property consti-
tuting it was situated. Was not the tax, in so far as it was increased
by the ownership of property outside the state, a tax on that property?
Why should New Jersey benefit from the fact that the non-resident
owned property elsewhere? It seems to me that the decision is to be
sustained only on the ground that the State of New Jersey might, had
it seen fit, have abolished inheritance entirely and, having that arbitrary
power, could impose conditions on the exercise of the privilege of inheri-
tance which, but for that power, would be unconstitutional. This argu-
ment is not available to support a similar income tax and Maxwell v.
Bugbee should not be extended into the field of income taxation. But
the language of the opinion is broad, relying rather on the "proper sub-
jee" doctrine,48 and one cannot say with any certainty that the Maxwell
case will be so limited.
WHo ARE "RESIDENTS"
Since income earned outside the state may only be taxed if the
recipient is a resident, it becomes of vital importance to know just what
constitutes a man a "resident" of a state. Eminent authorities have
said that if a person intends to remain where he is for some days, but
not indefinitely, that place is his "residence"; his "domicile" is where
he has his home and where he intends to live permanently or for an
indefinite period, though he may be temporarily absent.49 But in this
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gottlieb (1903) 190 U. S. 412, 23 Sup. Ct. 730;
Fargo v. Hart (19o4) 193 U. S. 49o, 24 Sup. Ct. 498; Wallace v. Hines (192o)
253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct. 435.
' Wis. Laws, 1913, chL 720, sec. 177ob, 7, (e); Reg. of N. Y. State Tax
Comm., Art. 457. Art. 47o authorizes non-residents to "submit an alternative
basis of apportionment with respect to his own income subject to approval by the
Tax Commission."
" (1919) 250 U. S. 519, 40 Sup. Ct. 2.
'-Ibid. 539: "A state may not tax property beyond its territorial jurisdiction,
but the subject-matter here regulated is a privilege to succeed to property which is
within the jurisdiction of the state. When the state levies taxes within its
authority property not in itself taxable by the state may be used as a measure of
the tax imposed." Holmes, J., gave a dissenting opinion in which three of the
justices concurred. Cf. Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Moss (1868, U. S.) 6 Wall. 632;
but see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas (191o) 216 U. S. I, 30 Sup. Ct. 190.
Minor, Conflict of Laws (1901) PP. 51-130.
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field "residence" is so generally used in the sense of "domicile" that
I here use it in that sense without apology or shame.
In international law it is not unusual to find a citizen of one country
domiciled in another, but in the United States, as between the several
states, such a thing is impossible. The Federal Constitution provides :
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the
United States and of the states wherein they reside." In the law of
the situs of the person it is fundamental that every person must have
one and only one domicile or residence. But, using the term "resi-
dence" in the more restricted sense advocated by legal writers, a man
may have his residence in one state and his domicile in another. Thus
where a person domiciled in Washington went to Virginia intending to
stay only long enough to complete certain business it was held that,
despite his Washington domicile, he was a resident of Virginia and his
property could not be attached under a statute permitting attachments in
suits against non-residents.5 So a New York court held that a persbn
having his domicile in New York but engaged in business and living
temporarily elsewhere was not a resident of New York within the
meaning of the statute abolishing the arrest of residents for debts aris-
ing under a contract.52 At least one New York court was led astray
by failing to note that in tax statutes "residence" generally means
"domicile." In Austen v. Crilly,53 though the taxpayer proved a
Philadelphia domicile, because he was temporarily living in New York
he was held subject to a tax on all his personal property, within and
without the state, which the legislature had imposed on "residents."
Under the Federal Income Tax Law residence is "that place where
a man has his true, fixed, and permianent home, and to which, whenever
he is absent, he has the intention of returning; it indicates permanency
of occupation as distinct from lodging or board, or temporary occupa-
tion. ' 54 The term is here clearly used in the sense of "domicile."
The New York Tax Commission has ruled: "For the purposes of the
income tax law a resident of New York state is a natural person who
has his fixed and settled abode in this state to which he returns from
incidental and temporary absences and from which he has no present
intention of removing. Such residence may not be nor be intended to
be of long duration if it be fixed and settled and to continue for the
time necessary to accomplish some business or other purpose and is not
merely transient." 5 As to the constitutionality of this test applied to
persons domiciled outside of New York, quaere.
Since income earned outside the state may be taxed only if the
U. S. Const. 14th Amendt. cl. i.
"Long v. Ryan (1878, Va.) 30 Gratt. 72o.
"Forest v. Brisbon (1837, N. Y.) 19 Wend. ii.
(1897, .ist Dept.) 13 App. Div. 247, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1097. As so inter-
preted and applied the tax was probably unconstitutional.
Act of Oct. 3, 1913, par. A, i.
Reg. of State Tax Comm. Art. 501.
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recipient is a resident of the taxing state it would seem to follow that
no income earned beyond the state while the recipient was a non-resi-
dent is subject to taxation. That was the position taken by the Court in
Hart v. Tax Commissioner," holding the taxpayer entitled to an abate-
ment for such portion of his income as was earned outside the State
prior to his acquisition of a domicile in Massachusetts. The New York
law provides that the term shall include, among others, "any person who
shall at any time during the last six months of the calendar year be a
resident of the state" 57 and provides for no abatement such as the
Massachusetts court granted. In so far as it does not do so this provi-
sion of the law would seem impeachable on constitutional grounds.
Whether X is or is not a domiciled resident of state Y has been gener-
ally recognized as a question for the courts of that state; other states
have generally recognized the decisions of such courts as conclusive,
though not actually binding on them.58 But when it comes to matters
of taxation states are not apt to so lightly relinquish a claim of juris-
diction over the person59 and the coextensive right to reach income
earned outside their territories. Suppose states Y and Z claim X as a
resident and both states tax his entire net income. We have seen that
a person may have only one domicile and that only the state of his
domicile may tax income earned elsewhere. But how shall X seek
relief? This question has never, within the writer's knowledge, come
before the United States Supreme Court. Yet if the rules of Shaffer
v. Carter0 are to be applied, some answer to the question must be found.
There are three grounds on which the Supreme Court might assume
jurisdiction to hear an appeal from such conflicting decisions. In the
first place, the "state citizenship" clause of the Federal Constitution
might be interpreted as prohibiting two states from simultaneously
holding any person a resident and citizen of each. Of course the judi-
cial power extends to all cases arising under the Constitution.8'
Or, secondly, the Supreme Court might set aside, as depriving the
taxpayer of his property without due process of law, whichever state
decision it should find to be erroneous. The "due process" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to judicial process.62
(192) 24o Mass. 37, 132 N. E. 621; (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 876.
N. Y. Laws, 1922, ch. 425.
"' In Tilt v. Kelsey (19o7) 207 U. S. 43, 28 Sup. Ct. I, it was held that an
adjudication of the Probate Court of New Jersey that the testator was a resident
of the state, though essential to the assumption of jurisdiction to grant letters
testamentary, was not binding as to the testator's domicile on the New York courts
under the "full faith and credit" clause.
Matter of Lydig (192o) 19i App. Div. 117, i8o N. Y. Supp. 843.
"Supra note 30.
U. S. Const., Art. III, sec. i.
In Muhiker v. N. Y. & H. Rd. (1905) 197 U. S. 544, 25 Sup. Ct. 522, it was
held that a decision which was not obviously unsound and in reliance upon which
land had been purchased could not be reversed by the State Court without violating
the "due process" clause. In Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co. (igo7) 2o7
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Or, finally, the Supreme Court might hold the tax law itself, as inter-
preted by the state court, to amount to a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law, in that it subjected persons who were not
"residents" within the meaning of Shaffer v. Carter3 to a tax on
income earned without the state.
WHAT CONSTITUTES "INCOME FROM WITHIN THE STATE"
There is usually no difficulty in deciding what constitutes income from
within the state so that it may be taxed though the recipient is a non-
resident. Clearly income from property or from any ordinary commer-
cial enterprise carried on within the jurisdiction is included, and so also
are dividends of domestic corporations and such portion of the dividends
of foreign corporations as may be said to be based on profits made
within the state. May a state tax interest payments on a loan merely
because the debtor is a resident of the taxing state?
The case of the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds 4 held unconsti-
tutional a tax which provided for the withholding of 5% of the interest
due on the bonds of a domestic corporation in the hands of non-resi-
dents. The decision was on the ground that the statute amounted to an
impairment of the obligation of contract, but the language in the opinion
suggested another ground. The Court said: "Debts are not property
of the debtors in any sense; they are obligations of the debtors and
only possess value in the hands of the creditors. They can have no
locality separate from the parties to whom they are due. A tax levied
by a state simply because the debtor resides there must be deemed an
arbitrary seizure of private property held in other states.... The bonds
are undoubtedly property, but property in the hands of the holders, not
of the obligors. So far as they are held by non-residents of the State,
they are property beyond the jurisdiction of the State. '65
Some five years later doubt was cast on the solemniter dictum quoted
U. S. 2o, 28 Sup. Ct. 7, it was held that the decision of an administrative board
might come within the constitutional inhibition. See Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1863,
U. S.) I Wall. 175; Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt (1883, U. S.) 16 How. 416, 432;
Thayer, Legal Essays (i9o8) 141; The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque (89) 4
HARv. L. REv. 311; Stuart v. Palmer (1878) 74 N. Y. 183, i9o; Chicago, Burling-
ton, & Q. R. R. v. Chicago (1896) 166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581.
To the effect that the "equal protection of the laws" clause applies to court
action see J7irgina v. Rives (1879) 100 U. S. 313, 322; Neal v. Delaware (188o)
lO3 U. S. 370; Fid. & Col. Tr. Co. v. Loidsville (1917) 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct.
40; Lombard v. W. Chic. Park Com. (19Ol) 181 U. S. 33, 2, Sup. Ct.
507.
"Supra note 30.
(1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 300.
"Ibid. 32o. The Court here seems to imply that the tax would be good as
applied t6 residents and, resting its decision on the State's lack of jurisdiction, that
it secretly regards as unsubstantial the impairment of the obligation of contract
point.
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above. In Murray v. Charleston66 a state tax on municipal bonds which
required the city to withhold a portion of the interest was held an
unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contract; but the Court
suggested that were it not for the withholding provision the tax might
have been good even as to non-residents, saying, "We do not care now
to enter upon the consideration of the question whether a State can
tax a debt due by one of its citizens or municipalities to a non-resident
creditor, or whether it has any jurisdiction over such a creditor or over




In the State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds case, 8 the fact that the
bonds were secured by realty in the State was deemed immaterial since
in Pennsylvania, the taxing State, mortgages were held to create a lien
only, and not to pass title. But in Savings & Loan Society v. Mutt-
nomah County69 the Supreme Court modified the principle laid down in
1872, holding that a non-resident creditor-mortgagee, even if he had
only an equitable interest in the mortgaged lands, had such an interest
as might be taxed in the state where the land lay.
7 0
In Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National7' the doctrine of the
State Tax case was further encroached upon. A foreign banking
corporation which, through a local agent, lent money in Louisiana,
taking checks as evidence of the advances, was held liable to pay a state
tax on those credits. The fiction of "business situs" was here given
birth; the capital was said to have acquired a "situs" in the State of
Louisiana. An important step towards this position had been taken
in Blackstone v. Miller,7 2 where it was held that New York might
impose an inheritance tax on funds of a non-resident decedent which
had been on deposit in a New York bank for a little over a year. The
Court said: "If the transfer of the deposit necessarily depends upon
and involves the law of New York for its exercise, or, in other words,
if the transfer is subject to the power of the State of New York, then
New York may subject the transfer to a tax. It is plain that the
transfer does depend upon the law of New York, not because of any
theoretical speculation concerning the whereabouts of the debt but
(1877) 96 U. S. 432.
Ibid. 448; New Orleans v. Stemple (1899) 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. io;
Bristol v. Wash. Co. (9oo) 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585.
"Supra note 64.
(1898) 169 U. S. 421, I8 Sup. Ct. 392; New Orleans v. Steinpel, supra note
67.
'0 In Kirtland v. Hotchkiss (1879) ioo U. S. 491, the Court had held that a debt
due from a non-resident might be taxed at the domicile of the creditor though
secured by a mortgage on lands outside the state. This is interesting as showing
the Court's attitude towards bi-state double taxation.
S(1903) 19, U. S. 388, 24 Sup. Ct. io7; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors
(1911) 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 55o, holding the non-existence of tangible
evidence of the indebtedness immaterial.
(19o3) 188 U_ S. i89, 23 Sup. Ct 277; Borden v. Burrill (1915) 221 Mass.
212, io9 N. E. 53; State V. Probate Ct. (95) 128 Minn. 371, 15o N. W. io94.
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because of the practical fact of its power over the person of the
debtor.173 In Wheeler v. Sohmere4 a succession tax on notes belonging
to a non-resident decedent was sustained for no other reason than that
the notes were found in New York but in Buck v. Beach75 an Indiana
tax on notes kept for safe-keeping in that State by a resident of New
York was.held unconstitutional.
In Blackstone v. Miller7 6 Mr. justice Holmes was unwilling to con-
sider where the situs of the debt might be but thought that control over
the person of the debtor and the creditor's reliance on the laws of the
state where the debtor was to collect his claim were sufficient to justify
the imposition of an inheritance tax. When the question is squarely
presented the Supreme Court may take the same position as to income
taxes imposed on interest payments from such a debt ;77 to date it has
always sought some further basis for sustaining such a tax, in addition
to jurisdiction and control over the person of the debtor.78
COLLECTING AN INcomE TAx FEOm NON-RESIDENTS
Where the income of a non-resident is taxable as accruing from a
source within the state what means are open to the state to enforce
payment? How can it collect?
In cases where tapping at the source is feasible that is the most satis-
factory method of collection. The English tax employs this method
against residents79 .as well as non-residents and it has proven satisfac-
tory ever since its introduction in 1803., Every debtor is ipso facto an
Blackstone v. Miller (19o3) 188 U. S. i89, 23 Sup. Ct. 277.
T4 (1914) 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 6o7.
(19o7) 206 U. S. 392, 27 Sup. Ct. 712; but cf. Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co.
v. Bowland (i9o5) 196 U. S. 611, 25 Sup. Ct. 345.
" Supra note 73.
This complete abandonment of the position taken in the case of the State Tax
on Foreign-Held Bonds is advocated and predicted by Carpenter, Jurisdiction over
Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishonent and Taxation (I918) 31
HAv. L. REv. 9o5.
"In Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles County (1922) 188 Cal.491, 205 Pac. 1076, the credits of a foreign corporation in the state for goods sold
on credits to residents were held not to be property within the state and beyond
the state's taxing power. Pendleton v. Comnun-wealth (19o9) 110 Va. 229, 65S. E. 536; State ex rel. Manitowoc Gas Co. v. Wis. Tax Comm. (1915) 161 Wis.
111, 152 N. W. 848; but see Boston Investment Co. v. Boston (893) I58 Mass.
461, 463, 33 N. E. 58o, 581.
' The use of this method to collect the tax on the income of residents is largely
a matter of choice. It might to some extent prevent evasion or concealment since
the tax is paid by a party on whom the burden does not ultimately rest, but it is
open to the objections that it does not lend itself conveniently to the application
of the progressive principle, that it quite generally requires duplication of returns,
that the sums received are subject to rebate if the net income of the taxpayer does
not exceed the sum of his exemptions, and that it imposes a burden on the debtor
class. But as to non-residents it is necessary as the only really effective way of
enforcing payment.
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agent of the government to collect the *tax. A debtor deducts the
amount of the tax from the stipulated interest and pays it over to the
government; an employer deducts the amount of the tax from the
salaries of his employees; a tenant, from the stipulated rent. Corpora-
tions are taxed on their entire net income and no corporate dividends
are taxed. To prevent collusion it is provided that any agreement
whereby a creditor is to receive his interest without deduction shall be
null and void. 0
The North Dakota tax alone, of all the state taxes, provides exten-
sively for collection at the source."- The Wisconsin tax provides for
information at the source in the case of corporation employers
8 2 and
debtors in general 3 as a condition precedent to the right to deduct the
amount of the wages or interest paid from gross income. The New
York law provides for information at the source as to residents; as to
non-residents it provides for withholding the tax on "salaries, wages,
commissions, gratuities .... and other fixed and determinable arnual or
periodical compensation of whatever kind and in whatever form paid
or received, earned for personal services and taxable under this article,"
if they exceed $i,ooo in amount.8 4 Any person so required to with-
hold the tax is made personally liable therefor8 5  The Federal taK only
requires collection at the source in the case of non-resident aliens.,
The employer, tenant, or debtor, stimulated by his being personally
liable for the amount of the tax on the salary, rent, or interest due the
non-resident, will generally comply with the law and withhold the sum
owing to the government. But suppose the non-resident is engaged
in business or in the practice of a profession within the state so that his
income cannot be tapped at the source, as a practical matter; or suppose
the withholding agent, designated by law, violates that law and the
state, for one reason or another, finds it impossible to collect the tax
from him. How can the state proceed against the non-resident?
If the non-resident has no property within the state and does not see
fit to return there is no means of collecting the tax. The courts of the
N. Y. Personal Income Tax, Art. 16, sec. 385 (N. Y. Laws, igig, ch. 627).
See also Woodruff v. Oswego Starch Factory (19o3) 177 N. Y. 23, 68 N. E. 994;
cf. Mt. Timber Co. v. Wash. (1916) 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260.
I N. D. Laws, 1919, ch. 224, sec. 8.
'Wis. Laws, 1913, ch. 72o.
Wis. Laws, 1917, ch. 23i.
4 N. Y. Laws, 192o, ch. 691. See Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (192o) 252
U. S. 6, 76, 4o Sup. Ct. 228, 230: "The contention that an unconstitutional
discrimination against non-citizens arises out of the provisions of sec. 366 of the
New York law, confining the withholding at source to the income of non-residents,
is unsubstantial. That provision does not in any wise increase the burden of the
tax upon non-residents but merely recognizes the fact that as to them the state
imposes no personal liability, and hence adopts a convenient substitute for it."
"For a full discussion of these provisions see Powell, Taxation of Personal
Income in New York (9"22) ch. II.
Act of Feb. 24, 1919 (4o Stat. at L. 1057, 1072) sec. 221a.
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taxing state could not give a.valid judgment against the delinquent; it
is perfectly well-settled that service by publication does not warrant a
personal judgment against a non-resident.87 Nor could the taxing state
resort to the courts of a sister state for aid in enforcing its revenue
laws. 8
If the tax is levied on the income from property within the jurisdic-
tion of the taxing state it is generally admitted that, like a tax on the
property itself, it may be made a lien on the particular property. 9 But
unless the statute provides for such a lien there is none, according to the
great weight of authority. A tax is neither contractual in its origin-
being an enforced contribution levied by the authority of the state irres-
pective of the consent of the taxpayer-nor is it a debt,90 and so payment
cannot be coerced by common law proceedings 9' in the absence of
express statutory authorization.9 2  Let us now see to what extent
property which is not the source of the income taxed may be subjected
to a lien for the amount of that tax.
An Iowa statute provided for the personal liability of land-owners
for special assessments on their property, in addition to imposing a lien
thereon. Pursuant to this statute, the assessed property having been
s31d and found inadequate to satisfy the assessment, the Iowa court, in
Dewey v. Des Moines,98 granted a judgment for the balance against a
non-resident proprietor who had only been served by publication and
never submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Execution issued on
the judgment and other property owned by the non-resident in the state
was sold to satisfy it. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court
it was held that, while the state might provide for the sale of the assessed
property, it could not "under any guise or pretext, proceed further and
'*Pennoyer v. Neff (877) 95 U. S. 714; Dewey v. Des Moinws (1899) 173
U. S. 193, 19 Sup. Ct. 379 (nor does appearing before the court to seek relief from
an unconstitutional imposition of personal liability amount to a waiver).
'In Colorado v. Harbeck (1921) 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E. 357, where the right
to sue in the courts of New York to collect an inheritance tax levied by Oklahoma
on a resident of that State was denied, the court said, at p. 82: "Taxes are not
debts or contracts. No contractual or quasi-contractual obligation to pay arises
out of the assessment of a tax .... Under the due process clause of the United
States Constitution, where the delinquents are non-residents of the taxing state
and outside its jurisdiction so that no personal liability or enforceable duty may be
established as against them and where the property involved is without the taxing
state so that no 'res' exists upon which the taxing state may impose a lien, the
state is powerless to collect the tax in its own courts and powerless to invoke the
aid of a sister state to collect its revenues."
Shaffer v. Carter, supra note 3o.
'Perry v. Washburn (1862) 20 Calif. 318, 350; Jonws v. Gibson (I885) 82 Ky.
56I; Appleton v. Hopkins (1855, Mass.) 5 Gray, 530; Lane County v. Oregon
(1868, U. S.).7 Wall. 71; (19o8) 21 HARv. L. REv. :283 and cases cited.
"1City of Camden v. Allen (1857) 26 14. J. L. 398; contra, United States v.
Chamberlain (1911) 219 U. S. 250, 31 Sup. Ct. 55.
City of Rochester v. Bloss (i9o6) i85 N. Y. 42, 77 N. E. 794.
(899) 173 U. S. 193, 19 Sup. Ct. 379.
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impose a personal liability upon a non-resident to pay the assessment or
any part of it" and that the judgment, since the court had no jurisdic-
tion over the person of the defendant, was a nullity, a denial of due
process.9 ' In Davidson v. New Orleans95 the Supreme Court had sus-
tained a statute which imposed personal liability on a resident for a
special assessment. Dewey v. Des Moines was taken to have decided
that any statute making a non-resident personally liable for a tax would
be invalid.9 6
A few years later, however, the doctrine of the Dewey case was
limited, if not in part overruled, by the decision in Bristol v. Washing-
ton County.97 A non-resident had been taxed on personalty within the
State of Minnesota and died before the tax was paid. The statute
provided that the tax should be a lien on all the property owned by a
delinquent within the state and 'the Supreme Cotirt, in sustaining the
allowance of the amount of the tax pursuant to a claim made against
the assets of the estate in the hands of th.e probate court, said:"'
"Dewey v. Des Moines is not to the contrary. What was ruled there
was that a citizen of one State cannot be cast in a personal judgment in
another State on an assessment levied there on real estate for a local
improvement, without service on him, or voluntary appearance, or some
action on his part amounting to consent to the jurisdiction." 99
The result of these cases would seem to be that, where a state levies
a tax on the property of a non-resident and that property is not of
sufficient value to pay the accrued claims of the State for backtaxes or
is taken out of the State so that it cannot be attached, the collector of
taxes may, if authorized by statute go against any other property of the
non-resident within the jurisdiction.100 It would seem that the same
* It is a basic rule governing special or local assessments that the assessment
may not be in excess of the value of the benefit conferred. That rule was
obviously violated in the Dewey case but the Supreme Court could not consider
it on appeal since the question was not raised in the lower courts.
9 (1877) 96 U. S. 97; cf. Emrick v. Dicken (i879) 92 Pa. 78.
"In City of N. Y. v. McLean (1902) i7o N. Y. 374, 387, 63 N. E. 38o, 384,
interpreting the application of a tax to stock owned by a non-resident in a domestic
corporation, the court said: "Even if the statutes of this state were intended to
confer upon officers of the plaintiff authority to maintain an action against the
defendant and impose upon him a personal liability for the payment of the tax
assessed upon his shares of stock yet, so far as they attempted to confer that right
they were beyond the power of the legislature to enact."
17 (ioo) 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct 585. It was never seriously doubted that a
resident-owner might be made personally liable for a tax on his property.
Palmer v. McMahon (189o) 133 U. S. 66o, IO Sup. Ct. 324.
11 Ibid. 140, 20 Sup. Ct. at p. 588.
'An assessment is not a tax. City of New London v. Miller (189o) 6o Conn.
112, 22 Atl. 499; Zable v. Louisville Baptist Orphan's Home (89) 92 Ky. 89,
17 S. W. 212; Austin v. Seattle (i89i) 2 Wash. 667, 27 Pac. 557; ef. McKees-
port v. Fidler -(1892) 147 Pa. 532, 23 AtI. 799.
1" Some ingenious persons have argued that after the non-resident has received
his salary for the tax year there is a cleavage, by the express provisions of the
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rule should apply to the collection of taxes on income. Not only should
subsequent income of non-residents from the same source be subject to
the payment of the tax'01 but even income from other sources within the
state should be chargeable with its payment. Yet in Shaffer v.
Carter " 2 the Court, after stating the delinquent's claim "that the State
is without power to create a lien upon any property of a non-resident for
income taxes except the very property from which the income pro-
ceeded; that a lien may not be imposed upon a non-resident's unpro-
ductive property, nor upon any particular productive property beyond
the amount of the tax upon the income that has proceeded from it,"
avoided these questions by saying that under the circumstances of the
particular case before them "the State did not exceed its power or
authority in treating his property interests and his business as a single
entity, and enforcing payment of the tax by the imposition of a lien, to
be followed by execution or other appropriate process, upon all property
employed in the business."
The problem is further complicated where the delinquent is engaged in
some enterprise authorized by the Federal Government or, for some
other reason, beyond the regulatory power of the State. Where a
corporation was authorized by Act of Congress to maintain telegraph'
lines along any military or post-road of the United States it was held
that non-payment of even a valid tax could not be made the basis of an
injunction against the maintaining of such lines.' 0 3 The Court said:
"If a resort to judicial proceedings to collect it is deemed expedient,
there remains to the court all the ordinary means of enforcing its judg-
ment--execution, sequestration, and any other appropriate remedy in
Chancery."'10 4 It would seem equally clear that a State may not make
the payment of a valid tax on a person's local, intrastate business a
condition precedent to the doing of interstate business or engaging in
foreign trade.10 5
statute, and back-taxes cannot be collected by garnishment of future salary. The
answer to this seems to be that income is really a flow of wealth and that this
fact is not altered by the law's requiring a balancing of accounts at the end of
each year.
"o N. Y. Personal Income Tax, supra note 80, Art. 16, sec. 35-1 (b) provides:
"Every tax imposed by this article, and all penalties, increases and interest thereon,
in addition to being a tax against property, business, trade, profession or occu-
pation, as in this article provided, shall also become from the time it is due and
payable a personal debt, from the person or persons liable to pay the same, to the
State of New York."
"o Supra note 3o, at p. 58, 40 Sup. Ct. at p. 28.
" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mass. (1888) 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961.
" Ibid. 554, 8 Sup. Ct. at p. 966.
" Postal Tel. Co. v. Adains (1895) 155 U. S. 688, 696, 15 SUp. Ct. 268, 269:
"Property in a state belonging to a corporation .... engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce may be taxed .... if payment be not made a condition precedent
to the right to. carry on the business but its enforcement left to the ordinary means
devised for the collection of taxes."
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BI-STATE DOUBLE TAXATION
We have seen how far a state may go in taxing income from sources
beyond its jurisdiction and income accruing to persons resident in
another state. But if State A taxes X on his total income and State
B taxes X on such portion of his income as is derived from the latter
State, it is e'ident that X will be taxed twice on that portion. Is that
fact of an r consequence as regards the constitutionality of either
tax law ?
Kidd v. Alabama' 6 answered this question in the negative. The
State of Alabama had imposed a tax on the stock of railroads incorpo-
rated in other states in so far as it was held by residents without impos-
ing a similar tax on the stock of corporations, domestic or foreign,
doing business in Alabama. The Supreme Court held that Alabama
might consider the fact that no tax was imposed on the property or the
franchises of foreign corporations doing no business in the State and
that the discrimination was reasonable. The Court spoke through Mr.
Justice Holmes :107 "We say untaxed because they are not taxed by
the State in question. The real grievance in a case like the present is
that, more than probably, they are taxed elsewhere. But with that the
State of Alabama is not concerned. No doubt it would be a great
advantage to the country and to the individual states if principles of
taxation could be agreed upon which did not conflict with each other,
and a common scheme could be adopted by which taxation of substan-
tially the same property in two jurisdictions could be avoided. But
the Constitution of the United States does-not go so far. The State
of Alabama is not bound to make its laws harmonize in principle with
those of other states. If property is -untaxed by its laws, then for the
purpose of its laws the property is not taxed at all." In short there is
no inhibition upon bi-state double taxation in our Federal Constitution.
There is nothing inherently unjust about double taxation. Only
where there is unreasonable discrimination is it objectionable. 0 8 But
"0'(903) 18 U. S. 730, 23 Sup. Ct. 401; Judy v. Beckwdith (i9o8) 137 Iowa
24, 31, 114 N. W. 565, 568: "Each state is sovereign within its own territorial
jurisdiction and its power to tax any and all property therein, except such as is in
actual transit through it, cannot be taken away, limited, or lessened by the act
of the taxing authorities of any other state"; Hawley v. Maiden (94) 232
U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct 201 (that a state in creating a corporation may provide that
all its shares shall be taxable there, no matter by whom owned, is no objection to
the taxation of such shares at the domicile of a non-resident-owner) ; supra, note
68; cf. State v. County Court (7879) 69 Mo. 454, where a statute was interpreted
not to include municipal bonds owned by a resident and kept in another state for
safe-keeping because that result would have led to double taxation.
o Ibid. 732, 23 Sup. Ct. at p. 402.
A single high tax on property is neither easier to justify nor easier to pay than
two low ones on the same property resulting from an over-lapping classification, or
a low tax on the property and another low tax on the income from that property.
Seligman, Essays in Taxation (i92i) 100; Paddell v. New York (1908) 211
U. S. 446, 29 Sup. Ct. 739; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas (9,5) 235 U. S.
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our hypothetical case presents such a situation. Had X invested all his
money and confined his business undertakings to the state of his resi-
dence he would have been taxed only once on his income. Because he
received income from another state he was assessed twice. Not only is
this result unfair to the taxpayer but also detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the states, individually and collectively. If every state exercised
to the full the taxing-power recognized in them in Shaffer v. Carter'0 9
and Kidd v. Alabama,z0 the effect would be the localization of capital
and the restriction of interstate commerce. Let us see if there is not.
some scheme or plan of taxation on which the state might agree to
their mutual advantage.
The Wisconsin tax, speaking generally, is on all income* from sources
within the State, no matter by whom earned, and on no other income.
Massachusetts only taxes certain classes of income and then only when
earned by an inhabitant of the State, but regardless of their source.
Oklahoma taxes the entire net income of residents and all income earned
within the State by non-residents. Pra~tically every conceivable varia-
tion of the taxation of intra-state income of non-residents and extra-
state income of residents is exemplified in the tax system of one or
more states. In poor states where but little foreign capital is invested
and where the residents own, in the aggregate, but little property in
other states it is really not of very great consequence which system is
adopted. In rich farming or industrial states it is of the greatest
importance.
Most states have not, as yet, adopted personal income taxes at all.
The Wisconsin tax is therefore open to the objection that it tends to
discourage investment in the taxing state in favor of neighboring states.
The rule of the Massachusetts tax is open to the objection that it
practically confers a bounty upon non-residents coming into the State
to work, though it has the advantage of inviting foreign capital. The
Oklahoma tax is likely to result in unjust bi-state double taxation. All
things considered, the rule of the New York tax law, at least until
income taxes are more widely adopted in the United States, is to be
preferred. The New York law, like that of Oklahoma, taxes residents
on their entire income and non-residents on their income from sources
within the State, but in addition provides that "Whenever a taxpayer
other~than a resident of the State.has become liable to income tax to the
State or country where he resides upon his net income for the taxable
350, 35 Sup. Ct. 99; Meyers v. Comnonwealth (igio) nxo Va. 6oo, 66 S. E. 824;
Opinion of the Justices (1gi1) 76 N. H. 588, 79 Atl. 31; cf. Opinion of the
Justices (1916) 22o Mass. 613, io8 N. E. 570; State v. Pinder (1gg, Del.) 7
Boyce 416, io8 Atl. 43; contra, Citv of Chicago v. Collins (1898) 175 Ill. 445, 458,
51 N. E. 91o: "It is a fundamental maxim in taxation that the same property
shall not be subject to a double tax payable by the same party, either directly or
indirectly."1 Supra note 30.
U°Snpra note 1o6.
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year, derived from sources within this State and subject to taxation
under this article, the Tax Commission shall credit the amount of
income tax payable by him under this article with such proportion of
the tax so payable by him to the state or country where he resides as
his income subject to taxation under this article bears to his entire
income upon which the tax payable to such other state or country was
imposed" if such other state grants a substantially similar credit to
residents of New York.111
But the day is not far distant when personal income taxes will be as
prevalent throughout the United States as taxes on real estate are
to-day. Then will this question have to be answered: As between
the several states should an individual's income be taxed where it is
earned or where he resides? Wisconsin taxes only such income as is
derived from sources within the State. The theory of the New York
tax is that each state should merely tax its residents on their entire
income. It is submitted that the latter policy is preferable both as
regards expediency and the fair claims of the states.
The argument that the levy of a tax on income derived from another
state, merely because the recipient is a resident, is an arbitrary exercise
of the taxing power, without economic justification, because that state
which contributes to the earning of the income should tax it, proves too
much. Is not the success of the Oklahoma business or fhe productivity
of the Oklahoma well due as much to the New York entrepreneur or
the New York capital, which makes its development possible, as to the
Oklahoma customers or the Oklahoma oil field? Indeed, acting on this
argument, would require the taxation of the income from the business
or well in the scattered states of the Union and abroad where the
ultimate consumers live. The argument that the state which protects
the source of the income should tax the income is plainly a non sequitur.
The state which protects the source should tax the source; an ad
valorem tax on the property for adequate compensation for the protec-
tion furnished. There may be some abstract justice in the claim that
each state should be allowed to tax a portion of the income but no theo-
retical, much less practical, method of equitable apportionment has yet
been propounded and the obstacles in the way of collecting a tax on non-
residents have already been pointed out.
' N. Y. Personal Income Tax, supra note 8o, Art. 16, sec. 363.
